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We are at risk. Increasingly, America depends on computers. They control power delivery,
communications, aviation, and financial services. They are used to store vital information, from
medical records to business plans to criminal records. Although we trust them, they are vul-
nerable-to the effects of poor design and insufficient quality control, to accident, and perhaps
most alarmingly, to deliberate attack. The modem thief can steal more with a computer than
with a gun. Tomorrow's terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with
a bomb.'
This remarkably prescient passage was published over a decade ago in the National Re-
search Council's seminal Computers At Risk report. Yet, it is only now, in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 tragedies, that government and industry are devoting the substantial
resources necessary to address the vulnerabilities of our information infrastructure. In re-
cent months, the U.S. and other governments and industry have redoubled their support
for cybersecurity initiatives designed to protect our information infrastructure against cy-
berattack.2 For instance, the United States has enacted the USA PATRIOT Act legislation,
and companies such as Microsoft and Oracle have announced that security issues will receive
much higher priority.3
It is unquestionable that cyberattacks pose a real threat to the Internet and the networked
business community generally. Just last year, attacks on computers shot up 160 percent to
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more than 52,000, according to the CERTe Coordination Center (originally known as the
Computer Energy Response Team), a major reporting center for Internet security prob-
lems.4 Moreover, in a recent FBI computer crime and security survey, 85 percent of re-
spondents revealed that they had detected security breaches within the last twelve months.
Sixty-four percent of respondents acknowledged financial losses due to computer breaches,
and the 35 percent (186 respondents) that quantified their losses reported $377,828,700 in
financial losses.' Although the FBI survey primarily focused on large corporations and gov-
ernment agencies, small and midsize enterprises (SMEs) also are at risk according to Gart-
ner Group. According to their projections, 50 percent of SMEs will experience a successful
Internet attack (e.g., Web site hacking) by the year 2003, if they (1) manage their own
network security, and (2) use the Internet for more than e-mail. 6 Further, organizations will
spend $14 billion by the year 2005 in order to fight off cyberattackers, according to a
projection by research firm IDC.1
However, bolstering cybersecurity may be a double-edged sword, staving off cyberattacks
to the benefit of those engaged in electronic communications and transactions, but simul-
taneously burdening the Internet and other networks by increasing the costs, both financial
and otherwise, of doing business. In other words, cyberattacks impose an indirect "tax" on
electronic communications and transactions, as new security measures drive up the cost of
doing business and undermine important values such as privacy. Accordingly, governments
and businesses must take particular care to ensure that, as they take steps to bolster cyber-
security, the benefits of increased cybersecurity outweigh the costs, some of which may be
quite difficult to quantify (e.g., the potential loss of privacy associated with increased net-
work monitoring).
In this article, we discuss domestic and foreign government responses to the cybersecurity
threat; describe corporate responses to this threat; and analyze how these responses them-
selves may burden the expanded development and use of the Internet.
I. U.S. Government Response to the Cybersecurity Threat
In an effort to address the cybersecurity threats facing the country, the United States has
relied upon its federal criminal law and has developed multiple infrastructure protection
initiatives. Many of these steps began years before the events of September 11, 2001 brought
security concerns to the forefront of American political priorities, but there has been a
renewed focus since that time, as evidenced by the USA PATRIOT Act.8
The United States government has long subjected cyberattackers to potential criminal
prosecution under a variety of domestic laws including: (1) the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA) of 1986; 9 (2) the Economic Espionage Act of 1996;"' (3) the federal wire fraud
statute;" and (4) various state criminal laws. For example, the CFAA criminalizes unautho-
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rized access to certain protected computers, including those used by financial institutions,
by the federal government, and in interstate commerce or communication. The CFAA also
criminalizes the knowing transmission of a computer virus or other code that causes inten-
tional damage to a protected computer. The CFAA reaches any person who, with the intent
to extort his or her victim, threatens to cause damage to a protected computer. Moreover,
once cyberattackers are identified, victimized corporations can bring civil actions seeking
compensation for damages arising out of CFAA violations or breaches of state common law.
In addition to the federal criminal laws designed to deter and punish cybercrime, the
U.S. government is engaged in more direct efforts to protect the country's critical infra-
structure against cyberattack. More than a decade ago, the National Research Council
addressed critical infrastructure protection issues in its influential Computers at Risk report.
Several years later, then-President Clinton established a Commission on Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection, whose 1997 report prompted the President to issue Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 63. PDD 63 not only required federal agencies to develop critical infra-
structure protection plans, but also, more importantly, outlined a general strategy to protect
the nation against the threat of cyberattacks. Recognizing the importance of information
sharing to critical infrastructure protection, PDD 63 encouraged the formation of infor-
mation sharing and analysis centers (ISACs). The ISACs were intended to serve as conduits
carrying information back and forth between the private sector and government, and by
March of 2001, six ISACs had been established in five different industry sectors.,2
Also as envisioned by PDD 63, the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center
(NIPC) serves as the U.S. government's "focal point for threat assessment, warning, in-
vestigation, and response for threats or attacks against our critical infrastructures."" 3 Op-
erating as a partnership between the federal agencies and private industry, NIPC seeks to
protect from cyberattacks the United States' critical infrastructures including: telecom-
munications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, water systems, emergency ser-
vices, and government operations.
Despite the United States' extensive federal criminal laws and infrastructure protection
efforts, the events of September 11 spawned a new set of cybersecurity efforts and initiatives.
In some ways, this seems an odd result. The U.S. information infrastructure was not tar-
geted by the attacks, and the Internet functioned rather well throughout the attacks, even
as other components of the U.S. infrastructure (e.g., air transportation, ground transpor-
tation, and cellular communication) were brought to their knees. Moreover, the events of
September 11 appeared to teach us little new about the threat of cyberterrorism. None-
theless, the terrorist attacks instilled a sense of urgency regarding previously identified
threats to U.S. cybersecurity. And, in the aftermath of the attacks, Washington significantly
stepped up its efforts to deal with the perceived cybersecurity "crisis."
Washington's post-September 11 "get tough" approach to cybersecurity was embodied
in both legislative and executive action. On October 26, 2001, just a few weeks after the
terrorist attacks, President Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act. The Act empow-
ers the United States government in its fight against terrorism by strengthening the federal
government's surveillance powers (Tide II); by enacting anti-money laundering provisions
12. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTINc OFFICE, INFORMATION SHARING: PRACTICES THAT CAN BENEFIT
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, Oct. 2001, at 6 [hereinafter GAO Report].
13. Ron Dick, A Message from Ron Dick, Director of the National Infrasmructure Protection Center, available at
http://www.nipc.gov/aboutlabout.htrn. See also GAO Report, supra note 12, at 6.
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to deny terrorists financial support (Title 1I1); and by strengthening federal criminal laws
against terrorism (Title VIII).
Several provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act are designed to deter and prevent "cyber-
terrorism" by strengthening existing criminal law.14 In reality, however, these provisions
simply strengthen the CFAA and thus seek to deter and prevent ordinary cybercrimes, such
as hacking and denial of service, rather than focusing on acts of cyberterrorism undertaken
to influence government policy. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act (1) amends the CFAA
to increase the maximum penalty for hacking from ten to twenty years; (2) expands the
CFAA's definition of "protected computer" to include many "computer[s] located outside
the United States;" and, finally, (3) expands the CFAA's definition of the term "loss" to
include "any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense,
conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information
to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other conse-
quential damages incurred because of interruption of service." 5
Equally important, the USA PATRIOT Act's focus is on deterrence through criminal
penalties, rather than prevention through added security. Yet one may question how prac-
tical it is to deter a teenage hacker, let alone an actual cyberterrorist. While stricter pun-
ishment for cyberattacks is a good thing, it may not prevent many future cyberattacks.
Addressing the "prevention" issue, a slew of cybersecurity-related bills are now pending
in Congress. These include: (1) the Cyber Security Research and Development Act 6 (H.R.
3394); (2) the Cyberterrorism Preparedness Act of 200211 (S. 1900); and (3) the Cyberse-
curity Research and Education Act of 20021 (S. 1901). Introduced by the Chairman of the
House Science Committee, House Bill 3394 earmarks $900 million to be divided between
the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institute of Standard and Tech-
nology (NIST) to establish various cybersecurity research grants. Senate Bill 1900 author-
izes NIST to establish a nonprofit (and nongovernmental) consortium of academic and
private sector experts to promulgate a set of "best practices" used to fight computer crime.
The legislation calls for government implementation of these best practices with the hope
that they will serve as a model for the private sector and envisions that the "best practices"
will be required of companies that do business with the federal government. Finally, Senate
Bill 1901 authorizes NSF and the National Security Agency to create new programs and
fellowships to attract promising students to the field of cybersecurity and to offer incentives
for teaching positions in the field.
Added government funding for cybersecurity is always welcome (except perhaps to the
extent it reduces funding for other important projects to enhance the electronic marketplace
and communications). It is of potential concern, however, if Congress seeks to establish
"best practices" that companies must follow, as envisioned in Senate Bill 1900. Such a "one
size fits all" approach may impose unnecessary levels of security costs, particularly on
smaller companies who handle less sensitive information. A more nuanced, less regulatory
approach, would be preferable.
14. See USA PATRIOT Act § 814, 115 Stat. at 382-84.
15. See id. § 814(c)-(d).
16. H.R. 3394, 107th Cong. (2001).
17. S. 1900, 107th Cong. (2002).
18. S. 1901, 107th Cong. (2002).
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In addition to legislative activity, there also has been a flurry of activity in the executive
branch. Indeed, several new cybersecurity-related posts have been created and filled in the
last six months. Within ten days of the September 11 th attacks, President Bush created the
Office for Homeland Security and named Governor Tom Ridge as its Director. In his new,
cabinet-level position, Ridge is responsible for coordinating the federal agencies' counter-
terrorism efforts to ensure domestic security. Shortly thereafter, National Security Council
member Richard Clarke was tapped to serve as the President's Special Adviser for Cyber-
security. Clarke, who reports to Ridge, coordinates federal agency efforts to secure infor-
mation systems as chair of the new, government-wide Critical Infrastructure Protection
Board. The Board is expected to develop, among other things, a system that federal agencies
can use to communicate information in times of crisis. 19
The Administration has also announced several other steps to improve cybersecurity.
The Department of Justice will staff a large computer crime fighting unit focused on com-
puter intrusion and the theft of confidential information from the computer networks of
high-tech companies. In addition, the Administration will be supporting two special initia-
tives: GovNet and Cyber Corps. GovNet will provide a means of securing sensitive gov-
ernment communications while Cyber Corps, sponsored by the Department of Defense
and NSF, is a Clinton-era program designed to encourage engineering students to take
government jobs helping to protect the nation's defense and telecommunications networks
against cyberterrorism.5
In addition to these somewhat piece-meal efforts to ramp up cybersecurity in the United
States, a more comprehensive cybersecurity strategy is expected to be announced in June
2002. Among other things, the Administration's strategy will outline "market based" mo-
tivations for companies to fortify their cybersecurity.' Such an approach would be consis-
tent with the need to ensure that the cybersecurity response, while forceful, is proportionate
to the risk and does not unduly burden the Internet.
II. Other Governments' Response to the Cybersecurity Threat
While much attention has focused on domestic efforts to protect against cyberattacks,
those beyond the Beltway also are striving to meet the challenge of cyberterrorism and
cybercrime. One of the most significant international developments to date is the Council
of Europe (CoE) Convention on Cybercrime,22 the first multilateral treaty to address crim-
19. Finally, the responsibility for global counterterrorism efforts has been placed on General Wayne Down-
ing, former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army Special Forces. Now the National Director and
Deputy National Security Advisor for Combatting Terrorism, Downing, like Clarke, reports to Ridge.
20. Roy Mark, GOVNET Aims To Protect Critical IT Functions From Attacks, available at http://
dc.internet.com/news/article/0,1934,2101_900961,00.html; Omer Gillham, Cyber Corps Students to Fight Terror,
TuLsA WORLD, Jan. 21, 2002, available at http://www.cis.utulsa.edu/InTheNews/cybercorpsstudentstofight
terror.asp. A copy of the government's request for information seeking suggestions from the U.S. telecom-
munications industry regarding development of the special GOVNET telecommunications network is available
at http://www.fts.gsa.gov/govnet/govnet.doc.
21. As the private sector operates most of the nation's critical infrastructures, it is on the "front lines of
homeland security," according to John Tritak, Director of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance, Office of the
Department of Commerce. See Pike & Fischer Report, Official Says Nation's Economic Security Primarily on the
Shoulders of Private Sector, Feb. 28, 2002.
22. Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, Eur. T.S. No. 185, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/projets/FinalCybercrime.htm.
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inal activity on computer networks. CoE is a forty-three-member pan-European interna-
tional organization that traditionally has dealt with human rights issues in Europe and also
has served as the forum for drafting pan-European law enforcement treaties.
The CoE cybercrime treaty was in the works long before September 11. Indeed, the
CoE began drafting the convention several years ago, and concluded the negotiations in
the summer of 2001. The United States signed the treaty on November 23, 2001, and the
Department of State currently is preparing a ratification package for Senate consideration.
The purpose of the CoE treaty is threefold: (1) to harmonize different nations' substan-
tive law pertaining to cyber crime; (2) to define investigation and prosecution procedures
using electronic means; and (3) to establish a system of international law enforcement co-
operation to promote the detection of international crimes and enforcement of criminal
law in cases that involve computer networks and require substantial cross-border corpo-
ration between law enforcement agencies.2'
The CoE treaty was itself a response to cybercrime and was intended to protect our
networked information systems from cyberattacks. Yet, in actuality, it may burden the very
systems it seeks to protect by imposing substantial costs upon Internet Service Providers
(ISP), Internet users, and others. For example, as part of its effort to harmonize the defi-
nitions of cybercrime offenses in different nations, the cybercrime treaty mandates that
signatories to the treaty criminalize the act of accessing a computer "without right."24 At
first glance, this provision appears simply to protect information systems against hack at-
tacks, denials of service, and other acts perpetrated by accessing a computer "without right."
However, this broad provision could impose a significant burden on Internet-mediated
communication, as it could be interpreted and implemented in ways that would appear to
criminalize a wide array of ordinary Internet activity when undertaken without specific
permission. The CoE provision makes the simple act of accessing a computer the basis of a
crime and fails to require that the actor access the computer with the intent to injure, or
with the effect of injuring, the computer or the data stored therein. Accordingly, the legality
of ordinary activities, such as placing a "cookie" on a Web surfer's computer, was called
into question. While language in the Convention's Explanatory Memorandum seeks to
address these concerns, the ability of treaty text to respond to the complexities of rapidly
evolving technology and practice remains a question for many.
A similar problem arises under the CoE treaty provisions addressing private assistance
to law enforcement to facilitate the interception, preservation, and seizure of computer data
and transmissions. In particular, the CoE treaty empowers law enforcement authorities to
compel an ISP to provide data "within its existing technical ability."2" This raises significant
concerns within the private sector that private entities could face an open-ended require-
ment to divert information infrastructure, servers, storage and information technology staff
to support interception and preservation, at substantial cost to (and requiring disruption
of) their ordinary business activities. Moreover, the actual costs to ISPs of implementing
this CoE provision are unclear. While the U.S. and French governments generally reim-
burse ISPs when they are compelled to provide technical assistance to law enforcement
authorities, other countries generally do not.
23. Id. preamble.
24. Id. ch. II, § 1, art. 2.
2 5. Id. § 2, art. 2 1.
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M. Corporate Response to the Cybersecurity Threat
As with the government efforts described above, corporate efforts to improve cyberse-
curity may itself burden the Internet. In the process of determining what procedures to
adopt to protect against cyberattacks, corporations must take into account not only cost
considerations, but also privacy concerns and potential liabilities arising out of their actions.
Below, we consider several steps corporations are taking to bolster their defenses against
cyberattack.
A. INFORMATION SHARING
Private sector organizations can promote cybersecurity through their participation in the
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers discussed above. ISACs promote private sector
understanding of cybersecurity risks by providing a forum within which corporations can
share--either among themselves and/or with government officials-information about cy-
berattacks, vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions and anomalies. ISACs already have been de-
veloped for various industries including: financial services, telecommunications, informa-
tion technology, and electric power. Some ISACs, such as the financial services ISAC, are
intended to function as partnerships between government and industry, although it is un-
clear whether much information flows from the private sector participants to government
officials.
Unfortunately, participation in ISACs is not without risks. First, ISAC participants should
consider the antitrust implications of this collaboration among competitors. Legislation has
been introduced in the House to promote participation in ISACs and the associated infor-
mation exchange.26 It provides that antitrust law does not apply to conduct undertaken
solely for the purpose of, and limited to (1) facilitating the correction of cybersecurity-
related problems; or (2) communicating or disclosing of information to help correct or
avoid the effects of a cybersecurity-related problem.27 However, the last major action on
this bill was taken on July 10, 2001, and considerable time is likely to pass before this, or
similar, legislation is adopted.
Second, a corporation's business proprietary information potentially could be disclosed
pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request if the government is an ISAC
participant. To alleviate this concern, House Bill 2435 specifically provides that, with certain
exceptions, identifiable information that is voluntarily provided to the government via an
ISAC shall be exempt from disclosure under FOIA. However, as noted above, House Bill
2435 is likely to remain pending for some time.
Corporations also should consider the potential for liability arising out of ISAC partic-
ipation and should determine whether or not the ISACs in which they participate are struc-
tured to minimize these risks. For example, ISAC participants may incur liability for pro-
viding inaccurate information; failing to protect sensitive ISAC information; failing to heed
a warning issued by the ISAC; or failing to disclose information that could have prevented
a cybersecurity attack. Finally, ISACs themselves could potentially be exposed to liability
for providing inaccurate information to members; failing to detect a breach; failing to share
or disclose information; failing to protect anonymity (raising privacy concerns); or failing
26. Cyber Security Information Act, H.R. 2435, 107th Cong. (2001).
27. See id.
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to protect proprietary data. Of course, ISACs can minimize their own exposure to liability
via ISAC membership agreements and member operating rules.
B. DATA SECURITY MESURES
1. Encryption
Encryption is an important element of data security; however, its import, export, and use
are heavily regulated in a number of countries. Accordingly, global corporations often can-
not widely deploy encryption products to foreign offices without significant costs.
While the United States has progressively relaxed its restrictions on encryption export
since the mid- 1990s, many other countries - most notably France, China and Russia - have
maintained stringent rules on the import, export, and use of even the most basic encryption
items. Companies with a global presence that rely upon encryption to, for example, secure
inter-office communications, must pay careful attention to the legal rules in multiple coun-
tries to avoid engaging in unauthorized, and potentially illegal, encryption import, export,
and use. The widespread dissemination of encryption technology has led many lawmakers
to believe that strong encryption controls, such as those maintained in Russia, are practically
unenforceable. However, law-abiding companies that wish to use strong encryption for data
security purposes still must commit the time and resources to obtain the necessary author-
izations and licenses prior to import, export, and use of encryption items. The need to
acquire and deploy strong encryption is another burden on the growth of the Internet.
2. Information Security Programs
Information security programs are another important element of data security. In order
to protect data against cybersecurity threats, many businesses have begun to develop and
implement information security policies. Moreover, in some regulated industries, including
the financial services and health care industries, federal law requires (or will soon require)
the development of information security programs.
For example, under interagency guidelines promulgated by the federal banking agencies
pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 199928
(GLB), financial institutions are required to establish written information security programs
as part of their efforts to maintain the confidentiality of customer information. The inter-
agency guidelines require, inter alia, that financial institutions identify and assess risks to
information security and confidentiality; write a risk management plan; implement and test
the plan; and adjust the plan in response to changes in the technology, the sensitivity of
customer information, or the threat to the confidentiality of customer information.Q
Just as GLB protects personally identifiable financial information, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 199630 (HIPAA) protects certain health care infor-
mation. In particular, protected health care information that is electronically stored, main-
tained or transmitted must be protected to ensure privacy and confidentiality. In contrast
to the relatively flexible approach that the banking agencies took when developing their
GLB implementing regulations, the Department of Health and Human Services has pro-
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1999).
29. Department of Treasury, Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer Infor-
mation, 12 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 30, app. B, et al., Feb. 1, 2001.
30. Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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posed rather prescriptive information security standards to implement HIPAA. The pro-
posed information security regulations require covered health care providers to take specific
steps to protect the security and confidentiality of protected health information."
The interagency information security guidelines promulgated pursuant to GLB take a
sensible approach to cybersecurity. They set broad parameters within which financial in-
stitutions must operate and then permit the market to determine precisely how much cy-
bersecurity is necessary and cost-effective within those parameters. However, the proposed
information security regulations to implement HIPAA indiscriminately mandate that health
care providers follow numerous particular security practices, making it nearly impossible
for health care providers to comply with all of the regulations in a cost-effective way. Ac-
cordingly, these standards are likely to impose an enormous financial burden on covered
health care providers.
Organizations implementing information security programs must be concerned not only
with the substantial immediate costs, but also with the potential for eventual liability. For
example, organizations posting their information security policies to their Web sites in
order to build customer trust should be aware that failure to comply with the stated terms
of a posted security policy could lead to legal exposure.
C. EMPLOYEE MONITORING
Corporations that monitor use of their computer systems to enhance security must pay
careful attention to employee privacy protections, particularly in the European Union (EU).
In the EU, employees generally have a right to privacy at the workplace, but that right is
not absolute. In the EU, companies generally are permitted to monitor employees if their
monitoring is systematic, general and proportional. However, in all Member States where
the company has a fixed establishment (or, for a U.S. company, in all Member States in
which the company has a server) it must, in order to comply with the Data Protection
Directive,32 notify the data protection authorities of its computer monitoring system. And,
in order to monitor a particular individual, the corporation must have a justified suspicion
about the individual and must obtain approval from the Worker's Council under the labor
laws of most Member States.
The rules in France are even stricter. France's top court (the Cour de Cassation, Chambre
Sociale) ruled in October of 2001, that employers do not have the right to read their
employees' private electronic mail or other personal computer files when it is clear from
the header of the e-mail or the name of the file that the information contained therein is
strictly private." This decision could raise the cost of monitoring for multinational com-
panies as security professionals discontinue use of system-wide security tools for fear that
some of the employees whose online behavior is examined will turn out to be French.
In light of the EU's privacy protections, global companies doing business in the EU will
want to consider adopting a code of conduct to govern their monitoring efforts. Such a
code of conduct can be used to establish, if necessary, that the corporation's monitoring is
systematic, general and proportional. Among other things, such a code of conduct might
31. Security and Electronic Signature Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 155 (proposed Aug. 12, 1998) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pt. 142).
32. Council Directive 95/46, 1998 OJ. (L 2) 13.
33. See Nikon France v. Onos, Cass. Soc., Arret No. 41-6410/2/01.
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provide that: (1) network monitoring tools are to be used as necessary to protect the network
from security breaches; (2) comprehensive monitoring should, as much as possible, be
performed automatically, rather than by persons; and (3) the corporation should avoid un-
necessary breaches of privacy and/or public disclosure of information obtained through
monitoring.
IV. Conclusion
September 11 was a wake-up call on security issues for many in government and industry,
and it has since been used as the impetus for action on cybersecurity in particular. Although
the United States did not experience a cyberattack on September 11, the events of that day
have triggered a concerted effort to achieve heightened cybersecurity.
In deciding what cybersecurity measures to adopt, the clear benefits of improved cyber-
security must be balanced against competing considerations, including the cost, loss of
privacy, and potential liability associated with many cybersecurity measures. If we fail to
consider these - often-unintended - results of increased cybersecurity, we may unduly bur-
den our ability to achieve globalization via the Internet, one of the true promises of the
Information Age.
One may ask whether or not economics, alone, will be a sufficient motivator for corpo-
rations to adopt good information security measures. To the extent that companies are aware
of information about economic risks, they can be expected to respond to that information.
For example, if a bank learns that a hacker has stolen funds from another bank, it is likely
to take added security precautions to protect itself from such theft. Companies will evaluate
the cost of various security measures against the probability of cyberattacks and the mag-
nitude of loss that may result. Based on information about the security risks, and the costs,
financial and otherwise, of taking various security measures, companies will seek to achieve
the greatest increase in security at the lowest cost. This should result in relatively good
decisions about the appropriate level of security.
However, a key caveat for public policy decision-makers is whether corporations (1) have
adequate information, and (2) have adequate incentives to consider "externalities," e.g., the
impact upon other companies and individuals in the society if the company's security mea-
sures are insufficient. As efficient markets depend on information, it is clear that, at the
very least, information sharing, whether through ISACs or through other channels, is im-
portant if corporations are to find a socially optimal level of investment in security.
As to the externalities, public decision-makers must consider, when deciding whether to
encourage or mandate security measures, the level of risk to critical infrastructure that may
arise from security flaws in particular sectors. Is there a real threat to critical infrastructure
or is the risk simply that a company will suffer economic harm? The probability of lower
impact events (e.g., hacking and denial of service) appears to be much higher than the
probability of an event with a severe impact on the Internet or telecommunications grid.
Heightened cybersecurity via government regulation may nonetheless be warranted in
light of associated externalities and risks that are not adequately considered by the private
sector. Currently, the Administration is relying on "jaw-boning" of U.S. industry. However,
to the extent that companies underinvest in cybersecurity, it ultimately may be necessary
to create incentives to get industry to respond to the need for greater cybersecurity (as the
Administration is already contemplating) or, if the problem is severe enough, to enact reg-
ulations or legislation addressing this issue. Nonetheless, any governmental mandates that
are imposed should be taken as a last resort, and should minimize the burden placed on
industry, to ensure that the security cure is not worse than the cyberattack disease.
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